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Abstract
This paper compares the performance of simple voting rules, called refer-
enda, to the performance of interim eÆcient mechanisms for the provision of a
public good. In a referendum, voters simply vote for or against the provision
of the public good, and production of the public good depends on whether or
not the number of yes votes exceeds a prespecied threshold. Costs are shared
equally. We show that in large populations for any interim eÆcient allocation
rule, there exists a corresponding referendum that yields approximately the
same total welfare when there are many individuals. Moreover, if there is a
common value component to the voters' preferences, then there is a unique
approximating referendum.
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1 Introduction
In his seminal paper on decentralization, Hurwicz (1972) sets out a general framework
for the mechanism design approach to welfare economics. Many subsequent papers
have followed through on the insights of that paper in various applications, including
auctions, contracting, public goods, organizational structure, and other topics. Yet
one important component of the Hurwicz framework is absent from most of this
work. That component is the cost of operating the mechanism. Instead, the primary
focus has been on the constraints imposed by incentive compatibility and individual
rationality. The tradeo we wish to focus on in this paper is between the attainment
of an incentive-constrained optimum and the cost of the institution required to do
so. The closest attempts to explore this issue have posed the question, \What is the
smallest message space required to exactly implement the optimum?"
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While this
does indirectly address the issue of how costly it is to decentralize certain outcomes,
it does not ask the tradeo question: \When is it better to use a cheaper mechanism
and attain somewhat less than the incentive-constrained optimum?" This paper
addresses a version of the latter question in the context of a classical public goods
environment.
A group of individuals must decide on a level of a public good that is produced
according to constant returns to scale up to some capacity constraint. In addition to
deciding the level of public good, the group must decide how to tax the individuals
in the group in order to cover the cost. The distribution of the burden of taxation is
1
The seminal paper is Mount and Reiter (1974). The problem has also been investigated in the
context of team theory. See, for example, Marschak and Radner (1972).
2
important because dierent individuals have dierent marginal rates of substitution
between the private good (taxes) and the public good. These individual marginal
rates of substitution are private information; that is, each individual knows his or her
own marginal rate of substitution, but not those of the other members of the group.
Adopting a Bayesian mechanism design framework, we assume that the distribution
of marginal rates of substitution is common knowledge.
We are interested in characterizing the performance of simple mechanisms with
extremely small message spaces, and comparing performance with optimal mecha-
nisms, using interim eÆciency as the benchmark. In an earlier paper (Ledyard and
Palfrey 1999), we fully characterized the set of interim eÆcient mechanisms, and we
use this characterization in the analysis. Interim eÆciency is the natural extension
of Pareto optimality when applied to problems of Bayesian mechanism design. An
allocation rule is interim eÆcient if it is (Bayesian) incentive compatible and there is
no other Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rule that is (weakly) prefered by all
types of all agents. In the context of our public good problem, the classical Lindahl-
Samuelson public good decision (coupled with particular incentive taxes) is but one
of many interim eÆcient allocation rules. In fact, there is an innite dimensional set
of interim eÆcient public good allocation rules, which vary with respect to both the
incidence of incentive taxes across agents and types and also the mapping from type
proles to the public good decision.
The simple mechanisms we investigate are referenda, which are the class of anony-
mous and informative mechanisms that use the smallest possible message space. Each
player's message contains one bit of information, which we call a vote. If the propor-
tion of yes voters exceeds a prespecied threshold, then the public good is produced
3
at maximum capacity and costs are shared equally among all agents. If the propor-
tion of yes voters falls short of the prespecied threshold, then the public good is not
produced and no taxes are collected.
An earlier paper establishes the eÆciency of referenda and equal taxation for the
very special case where types are identically distributed and can only take on two
values (Ledyard and Palfrey 1994). There it was shown that interim eÆciency always
takes a special form whereby the public good is provided if and only if the number of
high valuation types exceeds a threshold number which depends on the welfare weights
and the distribution of types. The greater the welfare weight on high valuation types,
the lower the optimal threshold. Obviously, such allocation rules require only a single
bit of information from the agents, so that a yes/no voting mechanism is isomorphic
to an anonymous direct mechanism. With more than two types (as in this paper) the
optimal mechanism generally depends on the exact prole of types in a complicated
way.
The central nding of this paper is that with large numbers of individuals, a
similar result obtains regardless of the number of types. Specically, we show for a
continuum of types that in large populations the performance of the optimal mecha-
nisms can be approximated by referenda. For every interim eÆcient mechanism there
is a referendum such that the aggregate welfare achieved from the voting scheme con-
verges, as the population grows, to the aggregate welfare achieved from the interim
eÆcient mechanism. Moreover, if the distribution of valuations is not known precisely
by the planner, then the optimal referendum is uniquely determined.
Therefore, referenda satisfy three important desiderata: eÆciency, simplicity, and
robustness. It is simple not only with respect to the very small message space, but
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also by avoiding complex tax/transfer rules that depend on the exact prole of types
in very complicated ways (d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 1979). In addition to
their simplicity, these voting mechanisms have the property that players have dom-
inant strategies, which eliminates strategic uncertainty from the points of view of
the participants and the planner. Third, referenda are robust with respect to mis-
specication of prior beliefs or attitudes toward risk. That is, risk averse participants
will behave the same as risk neutral participants, and all participants will vote the
same regardless of their prior beliefs about the distribution of the other participants'
valuations.
2
Given these attractive properties, it should not be surprising that referenda are
so widely used in practice. Many countries rely heavily on these binary mechanisms
to decide whether to undertake certain public projects. Examples are abundant. In
many states in the US, such as California, bond issues for roads, prisons, schools, and
other public projects are often ballot items in general elections, as yes/no initiative
about social policy. In Switzerland, national referenda are the rule rather than the
exception, to decide many policy issues.
Other papers have examined the behavior of both majority rule and optimal mech-
anisms for large populations. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) show that in the limit
the only optimal mechanism that satises individual rationality never produces the
public good. Ledyard and Palfrey (1994) provides an intuition for that result based on
2
This contrasts sharply with previous work that has investigated the possibility of eÆcient dom-
inant strategy mechanisms in Bayesian environments by Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992). The
dominant strategy mechanisms constructed in that paper are very similar to the original Bayesian
incentive compatible mechanisms. They require the use of tax/transfer rules that are as complex
as the Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms, and also require risk neutrality and a correct
specication of common prior beliefs.
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the fact that as N !1, an individual's \inuence", or ability to aect the decision
goes to zero, so that all feasible incentive compatible, individually rational mecha-
nisms converge to zero production in the limit. Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2000)
extend and generalize these and related results about asymptotic inuence in voting
models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is outlined
in section 2 and the characterization of interim eÆciency is summarized. Section 3
establishes the approximate eÆicency of referenda for large populations. Section 4
shows that optimal referenda are unique if there is a random shift parameter to the
valuations.
2 The Model
There are N people who must decide on the quantity, q of a public good that is
produced according to constant returns to scale and has a maximum level Y = 1.
The cost of producing q 2 [0; 1] is equal to Kq. In addition, it must be decided how
to distribute the production costs. Because of the linear production technology, the
optimal level of the public good will always be either 0 or 1, so our results also apply
to the case of deciding on whether or not to produce a discrete public good.
3
We let
a
i
denote individuals i's share of the cost, in units of the consumption of the private
good, and assume it can take any real value. Therefore the set of feasible levels of
production and cost shares are given by
3
There are are also knife-edge cases where both 0 and 1 are optimal, in which case any level of
the public good between 0 and 1 is also optimal.
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(a
1
; : : : ; a
N
; q) 2 <
N
 [0; 1]
such that
Kq 
N
X
i=1
a
i
:
Individual preferences are assumed to be risk-neutral and quasilinear in the level
of public good production and the taxes (cost shares), so the utility to type v
i
of
agent i for an allocation (q; a) is given by
V
i
= v
i
q   a
i
:
Thus, v
i
represents the marginal rate of substitution between the public and private
good, or \public good valuation" of type v
i
. We refer to v
i
as player i's \value." We
assume that each individual knows his own value, v
i
, and does not know the values
of the other individuals. We assume that the individual values (v
i
) are independently
distributed, with the (common knowledge) cdf of i's value denoted F
i
() and the
support of F
i
is V
i
= [v
i
; v
i
], where v
i
< K=N < v
i
. We assume F
i
has a continuous
positive density on V
i
.
2.1 Mechanisms
A mechanism is a game form, which consists of a message (strategy) space for each
agent and an outcome function mapping message proles into probability distributions
7
over the set of feasible allocations. By the revelation principle, the properties (in
terms of allocation rules) of any optimal mechanism can be duplicated by an incentive
compatible, direct mechanism in which the message space for agent i is simply the set
of possible types (values) in the support of F
i
. A strategy for i in a direct mechanism
is a mapping 
i
: V
i
! V
i
, that is, a decision rule that species a reported type
for each possible type. We refer to the identity mapping as the truthful strategy.
By the linearity of the individual utility functions, there is also no loss in restricting
attention to deterministic mechanisms. Thus, we denote a direct mechanism simply
as a feasible deterministic allocation rule:
 : V
N
 ! f(a
1
; : : : ; a
N
; q) 2 R
N
 [0; 1]j
N
X
i=1
a
i
 Kqg:
We denote the public good allocation component of  at type prole v by q(v), and
the private good tax for i by a
i
(v).
Besides feasibility, the main restriction on  is that it be incentive compatible,
which means that it is a Bayesian equilibrium of  for all agents to adopt a strategy
of truthfully reporting their type. Given a strategy 
i
, and a mechanism, , let the
interim utility of type v
i
of agent i, assuming all others truthfully report their type,
be denoted by:
u^
i
(; v
i
; 
i
) =
Z
V
 i
[v
i
q(
i
(v
i
); v
 i
)  a
i
(
i
(v
i
); v
 i
)]dF (vjv
i
)
Let u
i
(; v
i
)  u^
i
(; v
i
; I) where I denotes the truthful strategy I(v
i
) = v
i
. Then  is
incentive compatible if and only if u
i
(; v
i
)  u^
i
(; v
i
; 
i
) for all v
i
, 
i
.
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2.2 Optimal Mechanisms
The set of interim incentive eÆcient allocation rules
4
can be represented as the solu-
tions to a family of maximization problems. Let  > 0 be a system of welfare weights,
a measurable function mapping types into the positive real line, so that 
i
(v
i
) repre-
sents the welfare weight assigned to type v
i
of agent i. Then  is interim eÆcient if
and only if there exists  such that  maximizes 
i
R
v
i
v
i

i
(v
i
)u
i
(; v
i
)dF
i
(v
i
) over the
set of feasible and incentive compatible mechanisms.
5
Ledyard and Palfrey (1999) characterize the set of interim eÆcient allocation rules,
which can be summarized as follows. Fix a system of welfare weights such that
R
v
i
v
i

i
(v
i
)dF
i
(v
i
) = 1. Let
w
i
(v
i
;)  v
i
 
1  F
i
(v
i
)
f
i
(v
i
)
+
R
v
i
v
i

i
(t
i
)dF
i
(t
i
)
f
i
(v
i
)
be called the   virtual valuation of type v
i
and let
b
q(v;) be given by the standard
ex post eÆciency criterion applied to the individuals'   virtual valuations, w(v;).
That is,
b
q(v;) solves
max
q
[(
X
i
w
i
(v
i
; )) K]q
subject to q 2 [0; 1]. Let
b
Q
i
(v
i
; ) =
R
b
q(v;)dF
 i
(v
 i
) denote the conditional (on
v
i
) expected output of the public good. We call
b
Q the reduced form of
b
q. Then as
long as
b
Q
i
is non-decreasing in v
i
for all i, then
b
q(v;) is interim eÆcient and can be
supported by type-contingent taxes in the standard way.
6
4
For the remainder, we simply refer to such allocations as \interim eÆcient."
5
See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983)
6
If
b
Q constructed by this algorithm is non-monotonic, then one can use standard techniques
9
2.3 Referendum Mechanisms
We identify a class of simple mechanisms, each of which uses a minimally informative
message space. Each individual transmits only a single binary bit of information,
which we call a \vote." It is as if each individual is asked whether or not he would
like to have the public good produced. If enough voters say \yes," then the public
good is produced and the cost is shared equally. Otherwise the public good is not
provided and nobody pays anything. We call such mechanisms referenda with equal
cost shares.
7
To be specic a J

-referendum has the following three properties:
(a) Each i votes, b
i
, yes (= 1) or no (= 0).
(b) The good is produced if
P
i
b
i
 J

and is not produced if
P
b
i
< J

.
(c) Each i pays
K
N
if it is produced and 0 if it is not produced.
Thus, in a J

-referendum each individual casts a vote either for or against the
production of the public good, which is produced if and only if at least J

\yes" votes
are cast, and costs are split equally. For each voter, it is a dominant strategy to vote
yes, if and only if v
i
 K=N . The incentive compatible direct revelation version of
this mechanism is:
to atten out the non-monotonicities. See Guesnerie and Laont (1984) for a simple geometric
explanation of this technique, which is sometimes referred to as \ironing."
7
In Ledyard and Palfrey (1994) we used the term lottery draft, since equal cost sharing is equiv-
alent (in expected utility) to randomly selecting, or drafting, M  N individuals to contribute an
equal (K=M) share to the production of the public good. If the private good space is discrete,
randomization of this sort is needed.
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q(v) = 1 if #

ijv
i

K
N

 J

= 0 if #

ijv
i

K
N

< J

a
i
(v) =
K
N
q(v) 8i
The reason for considering such mechanisms is that, as we show below, they are
almost interim eÆcient in large populations. By this, we mean that the eÆciency loss
from using a referendum instead of an optimal mechanism approaches zero in large
populations. The two extreme referenda, corresponding to J

= 0 (always produce)
and J

= N (never produce), are of independent interest and we refer to these as
command mechanisms.
3 Approximate Optimality of Referenda
It is fairly easy to see that, in small nite populations, referenda are generally not
interim eÆcient, except in extreme cases where the critical level of J

is equal to
either 0 or N and production is independent of the realization of the type-prole, v.
8
But suppose there is a per capita cost to operating a mechanism that is increasing
in the size of the message space. And suppose the per capita welfare losses from
using referenda instead of optimal mechanisms are negligable in large populations.
8
An example of this arises when v
i
is distributed on the [1; 2] interval for all i, and
K
N
< 1. In
this special case, production is always optimal independent of the actual draws of v. So J

= 0 is
eÆcient. Of course, in this case, there is no need to elicit messages from the agents at all.
11
Then, according to this criterion of net eÆciency, simple voting rules outperform the
optimal mechanism. We show below that this is always true if N is suÆciently large.
We present three approximation results below. In letting N grow, we permit K to
vary withN , but keep k xed, where k = K(N)=N . That is, the per capita production
costs of the public good are held xed. We restrict attention to the symmetric case
where V
i
= V
j
= V for all i; j, F
i
(t) = F
j
(t) for all i; j, and t 2 V , and 
i
(t) = 
j
(t)
for all i; j, and t 2 V .
3.1 Per Capita Welfare Losses from Referenda
In this section we show that the per capita welfare of an appropriately chosen refer-
endum converges to the per capita welfare of the optimal mechanisms. The intuition
for this is simple. For any given set of welfare weights, , and any N , consider the
J

N
-referendum with the property that the expected sum of virtual utilities, if ex-
actly J

N
individuals vote for production of the public good, is equal to kN . For
this voting rule, asymptotically in N , the public good will be produced if and only
if the average virtual utility is greater than or equal to k which is exactly the rule
that determines q(v) in section 2.3. Also, since the interim expected public good
production (Q
i
(v
i
)) is type independent in the limit, incentive compatibility requires
that the interim-expected optimal taxes approach equal cost shares as the number
of agents goes to innity. Therefore, in the limit as the number of agents goes to
innity, the J

N
referendum generates the same per-capita expected welfare as the
optimal mechanism.
Strictly speaking there is one other step in the argument. Remember
b
q is optimal
12
if and only if
b
Q
i
is non-decreasing in v for all i. Otherwise
b
q must be appropriately
ironed. So let us call
b
q, and its supporting taxes, the relaxed optimal mechanism to
indicate it is chosen ignoring the constraint that
b
Q be non-decreasing. What we show
below is that, as N !1, the J

N
referendum generates the same per-capita expected
welfare as the relaxed optimal mechanism. But the relaxed optimal mechanism must
generate at least as much per-capita expected welfare as the optimal mechanism.
Therefore, the J

referendum must generate the same per capita expected welfare as
the optimal mechanism as N !1.
Consider a sequence of J

N
-referenda where J

N
= j

N is set
9
such that the ex-
pected total virtual utility, if exactly j

fraction of individuals vote \yes," equals kN .
Denoting w
+
= E[w; v > k] and w
 
= E[w; v < k], this requires choosing j

so that
j

w
+
+ (1   j

)w
 
= k. What we do below is to replicate the economy, keeping
the distribution of individual types constant and also keeping the per capita cost of
producing the public good constant, and compare the per capita surplus using this
j

rule to the per capita surplus using the optimal rule, and show that in the limit
they are the same.
Theorem: 1 Let K
N
= kN , k xed. Let 
i
(v
i
) = (v
i
) and F
i
(v
i
) = F (v
i
)8i.
Let j

satisfy j

w
+
+ (1   j

)w
 
= k. As N  ! 1 the referendum mechanism
using J

N
= j

N is almost interim-eÆcient in the sense that it is feasible, incentive
9
Since N is nite, there is generally no exact value of j

satisfying this equality condition. What
we mean precisely is that ((J

N
  1)=N)E[w; v > k] + ((N   J

N
+ 1)=N)E[w; v < k]  k and
((J

N
+ 1)=N)E[w; v > k] + ((N   J

N
  1)=N)E[w; v < k]  k.
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compatible, and
1
N
X
i
Z
v
i
v
i
(v
i
)u
i
(
V L
N
; v
i
)dF (v
i
)!
1
N
X
i
Z
v
i
v
i
(v
i
)u
i
(
o
N
; v
i
)dF (v
i
)
where 
V L
N
denotes the J

N
-referendum mechanism with N individuals and 
o
N
denotes
the optimal mechanism with N individuals.
Proof: Denote by \Y ," the number of yes votes. By construction of j

, E[
P
i
w
i
=N
j \Y "= j

N ] = k, so that if there are at least j

N votes, then the expected sum of
virtual benets is greater than or equal to kN . As N !1, by the strong law of large
numbers, the expected average virtual benet when exactly j

fraction of the voters
vote \Yes" will converge in probability to k. In other words, the probability that this
J

N
rule and the optimal rule make dierent production decisions for the same prole
of types approaches 0 in the limit.
The reduced forms public good decision for the j

-referendum mechanism is:
Q
V L
N
(v
i
) =
Z
V
 i
q
V L
N
(v)dF
 i
(v
 i
) = Prob
8
<
:
X
l 6=i
b
l
(v
l
)=N  j

 

b
i
(v
i
)=N

9
=
;
where
b
l
(v
l
) =
1 if v
l
 k
0 if v
l
< k;
The expected taxes in the j

-referendum mechanism are given by:
A
V L
N
(v
i
) =
Z
V
 i
a
V L
iN
(v)dF
 i
(v
 i
) = kQ
V L
N
(v
i
)
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In the relaxed optimal mechanism, the reduced form mechanism is given by:
Q
R
N
(v
i
) = Prob
8
<
:
X
l 6=i
w
l
(v
l
)=N  k   (w
i
(v
i
)=N)
9
=
;
; and
A
R
N
(v
i
) =
Z
V
 i
a
R
i
(v)dF (v
 i
) = kQ
R
N
(v
i
)
For large N , Q
V L
N
(v
i
)  Q
R
N
(v
i
) for all v
i
. Incentive compatibility then implies
that for large N , A
V L
N
(v
i
)  A
R
N
(v
i
) for all v
i
. Therefore, for large N ,
Z
V
i
(v
i
)u
i
(
V L
N
; v
i
)dF (v
i
)!
Z
V
i
(v
i
)u
i
(
R
N
; v
i
)dF (v
i
):
But we know that
X
i
Z
V
i
(v
i
)u
i
(
V L
N
; v
i
)dF (v
i
) 
X
i
Z
V
i
(v
i
)u
i
(
o
N
; v
i
)dF (v
i
)

X
i
Z
V
i
(v
i
)u
i
(
R
N
; v
i
)dF (v
i
):
Since all individuals are identical, this implies
1
N
X
i
Z
V
i
(v
i
)u
i
(
V L
N
; v
i
)dF (v
i
)!
1
N
X
i
Z
V
i
(v
i
)u
i
(
o
N
; v
i
)dF (v
i
): QED
While this is a strong result, as far as justifying the use of simple dominant strategy
mechanisms for public good decisions, it would be even nicer to have a stronger result.
The reason to look for a stronger result is simple. One can show that in the limit,
15
for any optimal public good mechanism, the limit of Q
N
is either 0 or 1, depending
on the distribution of types and the welfare weights. Thus, using a similar argument
as in the proof of the theorem above, one can show that any sequence of voting rules
(or any sequence of mechanisms in general), with the property that the expected
production of the public good in the limit is the same as the optimal mechanism
(either 0 or 1, respectively), will also generate the same per capita welfare benets as
the optimal mechanism.
Suppose for example that E[w] > k. Then the command mechanism \always
produce," while being suboptimal for any nite value of N (and worse than the best
referendum, as well) generates the same per capita surplus as the optimal mechanism
in the limit, since there is almost surely production of q = 1 in the limit. Moreover,
any j

N referendum that xes j

less than some critical level, is asymptotically
optimal. Alternately, suppose that E[w] < k. Then the mechanism \never produce,"
while being suboptimal for any nite value of N , generates the same per capita
surplus as the optimal mechanism in the limit, since there is almost surely zero
production in the limit. Obviously, this indeterminacy problem arises because the
planner can compute the optimal limiting production decision ex ante. We next show
that this indeterminacy of optimal referenda in the limit is no longer problematic if
one considers a more realistic model in which the optimal limiting production decision
is not known by the planner ex ante. We obtain below the much stronger result that,
if there is ex ante uncertainty about the optimal limiting production decision, then
there exists a uniquely optimal referendum rule, which is not a command mechanism.
16
3.2 Total Welfare Losses from j

N
-Referenda
A stronger criterion for asymptotic eÆciency is the total (as opposed to per capita)
surplus loss of the j

N -referendum compared to the optimal mechanism. We prove
below that the total surplus loss from using the optimal referendum instead of the
optimal virtual cost-benet criterion goes to zero in the limit. We prove this for
the pure private values model (without the common value shift parameter), but it
is a straightforward exercise to demonstrate that the same result holds for the more
general model with the shift parameter. Moreover, for reasons shown in the previous
section, the more general result is uniquely true for the referendum rule dened by
E[
P
i
w
i
=N j #fi : v
i
+ c

 kg = j

] = k   c

. Since the argument is the same, we
omit it here.
By symmetry, the total expected welfare from the optimal mechanism is equal to
(suppressing the i superscripts, for convenience):
W
o
N
= N
Z
v
v
(v)[vQ
o
N
(v)  A
o
N
(v)]dF (v): (1)
and the expected welfare from a j

N -referendum is:
W
j

N
= N
Z
v
v
(v)(v   k)Q
j

N
(v)dF (v): (2)
Therefore, the dierence in the expected total welfare (i.e., the expected welfare loss)
is equal to:
W
j

N
 W
o
N
 W
j

N
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Theorem 2 Let K
N
= kN , k xed. Let 
i
(v
i
) = (v
i
) and F
i
(v
i
) = F (v
i
); 8i. Let
j

satisfy j

w
+
+ (1   j

)w
 
= k. Then the j

N  referendum is asymptotically
interim-eÆcient in the sense that it satises (I) and (F ) and:
lim
N!1
W
j

N
! 0:
Proof: A complete proof is given in the appendix. An outline of the argument is as
follows.
There are two sources of welfare loss from the referendum. First, there is some
distortion in the quantity of public good that is produced, since individuals send in-
formation only about whether they have \high" or \low" valuations. Fully optimal
mechanisms generally require more precise information about the prole of valuations.
Second, all types pay equal cost shares in the referendum, although the optimal mech-
anism typically requires the cost shares to be type-dependent. The proof proceeds by
showing that the total welfare losses from each of these two sources goes to zero in
the limit.
The magnitude of the rst source of ineÆciency is on the order of N times the
average expected dierence in the reduced form production decisions, Q
o
N
and Q
j

N
.
Both Q
o
N
and Q
j

N
are deterministic and equal to each other in the limit (i.e., equal
either 0 or 1). Thus, we only need to obtain a rate of convergence to 0 for Q
j

N
  Q
o
N
and show that this converges to 0 very fast. Specically, we apply a central limit
theorem to show that the speed of convergence is at least on the order of
p
Ne
 N
The magnitude of the second source of ineÆciency is on the order of N times the
expected dierence between equal cost sharing in the referendum and incentive com-
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patible cost sharing in the optimal mechanism. By incentive compatibility, optimal
cost sharing converges to equal cost sharing in the limit. We show that the speed of
convergence is at least on the order of
p
Ne
 N
: QED
4 Common Values: Uniqueness of the Approxi-
mately Optimal Referendum
A simplifying assumption has been made in the above analysis, that the distribution
of valuations is known by the planner. This simplication is convenient, but it is the
source of an unsatisfying result in the previous section. In particular, if the planner
knows exactly the distribution of types, then in the limit the planner also knows
the optimal level of production almost surely, so no referendum would needed. In
other words, while it is true that referenda are approximately optimal, it is also true
that not even a referendum is needed at the limit! We show in this section that a
natural and straightforward generalization of the model demonstrates that for any
given welfare weighting scheme there is generally a unique referendum rule that is
approximately optimal in the limit.
Dene c to be a common value component which is added to everyone's private
valuation, v
i
, to generate an adjusted individual valuation denoted r
i
= v
i
+ c. Thus
c is a parameter which shifts the distribution of valuations either up or down, de-
pending on whether c is positive or negative, respectively. We continue to use the
notation as before, where F (v) denotes the cdf of private valuations evaluated at v,
and (v) denotes the welfare weight assigned to a v-type. The common value com-
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ponent c is distributed according the continuous cdf, G(c). One can easily show that
for suÆciently low values of c, the public good should never be produced, and for
suÆciently high values of c, the public good should always be produced. We assume
that the support of G is the interval [c; c] where c < k  v and c > k  v, so the range
of possible common values is large enough to include very high and very low values of
c, where command mechanisms are optimal. Each individual observes r
i
and c. The
planner only knows F .
10
We now consider optimal referenda under this alternative preference structure,
with this common value uncertainty.
11
Let
c
W
j
N
and
c
W
o
N
(c) denote, respectively, the
total surplus under the jN referendum assuming the planner doesn't know c; and the
total surplus the planner could hypothetically achieve under
b
q(v;) if the planner
actually knew c.
12
This is clearly an upper bound on what an optimal mechanism
could achieve when the planner does not know c. We show below that there exists
a unique referendum that achieves this upper bound in the limit. Let W
j

N
=
c
W
j

N
 
c
W
o
N
(c).
Theorem 3 Let K
N
= kN , k xed. Let 
i
(v
i
) = (v
i
) and F
i
(v
i
) = F (v
i
); 8i.
Assume G has full support on [c; c] where c < k   v and c > k   v: Let j

satisfy
E[
P
i
w
i
=N j #fi : v
i
+c

 kg = j

] = k c

. Then the j

N  referendum is uniquely
asymptotically interim-eÆcient in the sense that it it satises (I) and (F) and is the
10
Neither the planner nor the individuals have to know G.
11
Since referenda are dominant strategy mechanisms, it is not actually necessary to specify any
particular common knowledge structure for the players, beyond the fact that r
i
is known by i. But
for concreteness, we have chosen to assume that c be common knowledge among the individuals and
assume v
i
is private information as before, with common prior beliefs about v given by F .
12
In other words, the benchmark \optimal mechanism" to which the referendum is compared is the
solution to a doubly relaxed optimization problem. That is, the optimization assumes the planner
knows c, and also assumes the constraint that
b
Q be nondecreasing is not imposed.
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only jN referendum such that:
lim
N!1
W
j
N
! 0:
Proof: It is easy to see that, conditional on c, the optimal mechanism requires
production if and only if the average virtual valuation exceeds k   c. That is, the
cost-benet criterion is simply shifted by the common value parameter. Denote by
c

the critical value of c such that E[w(v
i
);] = k   c

. That is, if c > c

then the
public good should always be produced in the limit, and if c < c

it should never be
produced in the limit. Since c < k   v; it must be that c

> c; and c > k   v implies
that c

< c. Therefore, c

lies in the interior of the support of G. Now consider the
j

N -referendum dened uniquely
13
by E[
P
i
w
i
=N j #fi : v
i
+ c

 kg = j

] = k  c

.
Voters have a dominant strategy to vote yes if and only if v
i
+ c > k. Observe that
this referendum is constructed so that, in the event c = c

, the expected average
virtual valuation, conditional on the proportion of yes voters exactly equaling the
referendum threshold j

, is equal to k   c

. Thus, if c < c

this referendum will
always fail to produce the public good in the limit, while if c > c

the referendum
will always produce the public good in the limit. By the same argument as in the
proof of Theorem 2 (see appendix) argument of the previous subsection, welfare losses
conditional on c go to 0 for every value of c (in fact, uniformly in c), except possibly at
c

. Therefore total welfare losses (integrating over G(c)) go to 0 for this referendum.
Next consider any jN -referendum with j > j

. For this jN -referendum there
13
Moreover, j

must be strictly between 0 and 1, since c

is in the interior of the support of G, so
the j

-referendum is not a command mechanism.
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exists a critical common value, c

> c

, such that, for large N , the public good is
only produced when c > c

. Thus, for realizations of c between c

and c

, the public
good will ineÆciently fail to be produced in the limit, even though the c-conditional
optimal mechanism requires production in the limit with probability approaching 1.
This generates a strictly positive per capita welfare loss, conditional on c, on the order
of c   c

for realizations of c between c

and c

. Thus, integrating over all possible
values of c, the expected per capita welfare loss is strictly positive in the limit for any
sequence of jN -referenda with j > j

; and therefore the total welfare loss diverges to
innity. A similar argument applies for any sequence of jN - referenda with j < j

.
Thus, other simple voting mechanisms are asymptotically inferior to j

. QED
Obviously the above proof also shows that the j

N -referendum is also uniquely
asymptotically optimal in terms of per-capita welfare.
5 Conclusions
In an earlier paper, we fully characterized interim eÆcient public good allocation rules
and identied type-contingent tax schemes which implement them under Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we proved that for any interim eÆcient allocation
rule there exists a simple dominant-strategy referendum mechanism which approxi-
mates the eÆciency of that allocation rule in large populations, and uses a minimal
message space. In a referendum, individuals simply submit a binary message (a
\vote") either for or against production of the public good. If a suÆciently large
fraction of the individuals vote in favor, then the public good is provided and the
costs are distributed equally in the population. Otherwise, the public good is not
22
produced. This provides an approximate \second welfare theorem" for public goods:
eÆcient allocation rules can be (approximately) decentralized by simple voting rules.
Moreover, if there is a common value component to the distribution of preferences,
then the optimal referendum is unique.
Our results about the asymptotic optimality of referenda were obtained by repli-
cating a population with the same distribution of types. There are a number of
interesting extensions, which could generalize the results in this paper in potentially
interesting ways. For example, if type-distributions or welfare weights dier across the
population, asymptotically optimal referenda might involve asymmetric cost shares,
or weighted voting. Other possible directions for future work includes relaxing the
assumption of independent types, considering more general forms of common and/or
aÆliated values, and introducing multidimensional types.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: From equations 1 and 2,
W
j

N
= N
Z
v
v
(v)(v   k)(Q
o
N
(v) Q
j

N
(v))dF (v)
 N
Z
v
v
(v)(A
o
N
(v)  kQ
o
N
(v))dF (v)
Thus, the expected welfare loss is divided into two terms. The magnitude of the rst
term is on the order of N times the average expected dierences in the reduced form
production decisions, Q
o
N
and Q
j

N
. The magnitude of the second term is on the order
of N times the expected dierence between equal cost sharing in the referendum and
incentive compatible cost sharing in the optimal mechanism. We apply a central limit
theorem below to show that both of these converge to 0 in N , although we nd that
convergence occurs at an order of magnitude faster rate for the second term than the
rst.
We begin by considering the rst term, N
R
v
v
(v)(v  k)(Q
o
N
(v) Q
j

N
(v)) dF (v).
Recall that both Q
o
N
and Q
j

N
are deterministic in the limit (i.e., equal either 0 or
1). Thus if j

is not chosen so that Q
j

N
 Q
o
N
, then we know that the expected
welfare loss goes to innity. However, we know from above that for j

satisfying
E[
P
i
w
i
=N j #fi : v
i
 kg = j

] = k we are guaranteed that Q
j

N
 Q
o
N
. Thus,
we only need to obtain a rate of convergence to 0 for Q
j

N
  Q
o
N
and show that this
converges to 0 very fast. We show below that the speed of convergence is at least
on the order of
p
Ne
 N
, so N times the expected dierence in interim quantities
converges to 0, and hence the rst term goes to 0 in N .
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In the optimal mechanism,
14
the good is produced if and only if
P
i
w
i
=N  k:
Thus, for an individual with private value equal to v
i
, the interim expected output
under the optimal mechanism is simply the probability that the sum of all the other
virtual valuations is greater than or equal to kN  w(v
i
) which equals the probability
that the sample average virtual valuation of the other players is greater than or equal
to [kN   w(v
i
)]=(N   1). Denoting the expected value of the virtual valuation of an
individual as w, we know from the Central Limit Theorem that the sample average
virtual valuation of N   1 has an asymptotically Normal distribution with mean w
and standard deviation 
w
=(N   1), where 
w
is the standard deviation of w. Thus,
we get
Q
o
N
(v)! 1  
2
4
 (w   k) 

w(v) k
N 1


w
=(N   1)
3
5
where  is the cumulative of the unit Normal distribution. Similarly, we can obtain
an expression for the asymptotic value of Q
j

N
(v). It depends only on whether or not
v is greater than or less than k. Denote by b(v) the vote of an individual of type v,
which is equal to 1 if v is greater than or equal to k and equals 0 if v is less than k.
Denote by b the ex ante probability of a yes vote (which is simply equal to 1 F (k)),
and which also equals the expected fraction of individuals voting yes. Then by a
similar argument, we get that
Q
j

N
(v)! 1  
2
4
 (b  j

) 

b(v) j

N 1


b
=(N   1)
3
5
14
We ignore the distinction between relaxed optimal and optimal mechanisms for the reasons seen
in the proof of Theorem 1.
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where 
b
is the variance of b.
By construction of j

, lim
N!1
Q
o
N
(v) = lim
N!1
Q
j

N
(v). That is, b   j

> 0 if
and only if w   k > 0: The dierence Q
o
N
(v) Q
j

N
(v) converges to
Q
o
N
(v) Q
j

N
(v) 
1
p
2
Z
B
N
A
N
e
 x
2
=2
dx
where
A
N
=  
p
N(b  j

)

b
 
b(v)  j


b
p
N
and
B
N
=  
p
N(w   k)

w
 
w(v)  k

w
p
N
Without loss of generality, assume that
b j


b
>
w k

w
, so that, for suÆciently large N;
A
N
< B
N
. Then for large N ,
Q
o
N
(v) Q
j

N
(v)  N
1=2
 
b  j


b
 
w   k

w
!
1
p
2
e
 N
(
w k

w
)
2
Therefore, the expected dierence between the interim expected quantities under the
optimal mechanism and the j

mechanism, N(Q
o
N
(v)   Q
j

N
(v)), is on the order of
N
3=2
e
 N
, which converges to 0 in N . This establishes that the rst term of the
expression for the total surplus loss goes to 0.
The second term of that expression is
N
Z
v
v
(v)(A
o
N
(v)  kQ
o
N
(v))dF (v)
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This can be rewritten as
Z
v
v
(v)[N(A
o
N
(v)  A) Nk(Q
o
N
(v) Q)]dF (v):
which can be further broken down into two terms:
Z
v
v
(v)N(A
o
N
(v)  A)dF (v)
and
Z
v
v
(v)Nk(Q
o
N
(v) Q)dF (v):
Consider the second of these terms. Because (v) is bounded, we just need to
show that
Z
v
v
N j Q
o
N
(v) Q) j dF (v)! 0:
The expression j Q
o
N
(v)   Q) j is less than or equal to Q
o
N
(v)   Q
o
N
(v); so we only
need to show that
Z
v
v
N [Q
o
N
(v) Q
o
N
(v)]dF (v) = N [Q
o
N
(v) Q
o
N
(v)]! 0:
Recall that Q
o
N
(v) = probfw 
k
N 1

w(v)
N 1
g so, using an argument similar to the one
above, the dierence Q
o
N
(v) Q
o
N
(v) converges to
Q
o
N
(v) Q
o
N
(v) 
1
p
2
Z
B
N
A
N
e
 x
2
=2
dx
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where
A
N
=  
p
N(w   k)

w
 
w(v)  k

w
p
N
and
B
N
=  
p
N(w   k)

w
 
w(v)  k

w
p
N
:
This is on the order of
p
Ne
 N
, so N [Q
o
N
(v) Q
o
N
(v)]! 0 as N !1. Therefore
Z
v
v
(v)Nk(Q
o
N
(v) Q)dF (v)! 0
as desired. By incentive compatibility, A
0
= vQ
0
, and by assumption v < v <1, so
it also follows that
Z
v
v
(v)N(A
o
N
(v)  A)dF (v)! 0:
Thus lim
N!1
W
j

N
! 0. QED
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